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EQUITY OR EFFICIENCY? EXPLAINING PUBLIC OFFICIALS´ 
VALUES 
Abstract 
This article analyses the position of top public officials in an equity-efficiency trade-
off, and the determinants of this position. It uses data from a survey across 14 
European countries. The results show that differences in public officials' position on 
equity-efficiency are related to the context within which they work and their personal 
background. Officials at the top of the hierarchy and those with a business or 
economics education. Additionally, results show important differences associated 
with country administrative culture, including a stronger equity orientation in 
Scandinavian countries, and a stronger efficiency orientation in Southern European 
countries. The position of public officials reflects that held by citizens in their 
country, confirming the contextualized nature of administrative values. This article 
contributes to understanding the determinants of public official's dominant values. 
 
PRACTITIONER POINTS 
• Understanding the determinants of the value trade-offs public officials make is 
key for the analysis of their policies. 
• Managers’ level in a public organization significantly influences their position 
on a trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
• Exposure of public officials to business or economics education, working 
experience in the private sector and seniority in the public sector is related to 
the equity-efficiency trade-off they make in their job. 
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• Important country-differences exist as regards the equity-efficiency trade-off 
position of senior bureaucrats. These differences are strongly related to the 
administrative culture of the country and to the dominant values held by the 
population in general. 
INTRODUCTION 
Conflicting values and value trade-offs have received a lot of attention in philosophy 
and economics. In public administration, attention for public values appear to be on the 
rise (Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014; Van der Wal, Nabatchi and De Graaf, 
2015), and substantial progress has been made in relation to mapping, categorizing and 
conceptualizing public values (Van Wart, 1998; Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2007; Van 
der Wal and Huberts, 2008; Molina and McKeown, 2012). 
Easton famously described politics as the authoritative allocation of values (Easton, 
1965). Government has to make choices between conflicting values. These tensions 
between values can be found everywhere within the public sector, especially when there 
is allocation and redistribution. The ‘uneasy compromises’ between values are 
represented in institutional arrangements (Okun: 1975: 1). Public management is about 
managing contradictions (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Greener, 2013). Civil servants 
want to achieve values and objectives that may be incompatible (Andrews and Entwistle 
2010; Andrews and Van de Walle, 2013; De Graaf, Hubert and Smulders, 2016) and 
thus have to choose in daily administrative practice. This article contributes to the body 
of research on conflicting public values and value pluralism in the public sector (Spicer, 
2015), as well as to the literature on trade-offs between equity and efficiency, both in 
general (Okun, 1975), and in the particular context of public services (Norman-Major, 
2011). In particular, the objective of this article is to analyze what factors determine the 
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position of public officials in a balance between equity and efficiency, using data from 
a large survey among top public officials in 14 European countries.  
 
THE EQUITY-EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFF 
The efficiency-equity trade-off is one of the perennial questions in the social sciences. 
A trade-off refers to a situation where one has to balance or choose between two 
objectives that are opposite or that cannot be had at the same time (Merriam Webster 
dictionary). Examples of the efficiency-equity trade-off can be found in the allocation 
of landing slots to planes, or in the order of serving clients in an administrative office, 
where it may be more efficient not to allocate in order of appearance. The issue is also 
very salient in school reforms, where officials have to find a balance between school 
efficiency improvements and avoiding social segregation.  
The academic beginnings of the debate on the efficiency-equity trade-off were 
attributed by Le Grand (1990) to Barry (1965), who discussed the evaluation of social 
outcomes in politics and policy. Barry argued that, if there is for someone a trade-off 
between equity and efficiency, this means that ‘If it’s a question of choosing between 
efficiency and equity, it takes a large potential increase in equity to make him accept a 
potential reduction in efficiency (and vice versa)’ (Barry, 1965: 7).  
Okun’s 1975 ‘Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff’ is probably the best known 
treatise on the efficiency-equity trade-off. While being different concepts, equity and 
equality are often used interchangeably. Equality refers to a situation where everyone 
is given equal resources (here, public services), whereas equity refers to achieving an 
equality of outcomes (that is, the resources are related to needs). We will use equity in 
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this article, except for situations where the original source uses equality. Okun 
discussed the observation that society often prefers equality-based approaches over 
market-based efficiency-oriented ones, and that, for this reason, checks on markets 
would be common and sometimes desirable. He argued that there are areas where 
society opts for more equality, thereby compromising efficiency (Okun: 1975: 5). The 
opposite is not discussed in great length in Okun’s book, because, addressing 
economists, he assumed they would be familiar with such market logic already. Markets 
pursue efficiency ‘But that pursuit of efficiency necessarily created inequalities. And 
hence society faces a trade-off between equality and efficiency’ (Okun, 1975: 1). In 
other words – ‘We can’t have our cake of market efficiency and share it equally’ 
(Okun:, 1975: 2)  
The book is written with distributive policies in mind, and introduced the image of a 
‘leaky bucket’. The leaky bucket refers to efficiency losses due to redistribution 
addressed at reducing inequality, which result from changes in incentives and 
administrative costs involved in redistribution (Okun: 1975: 92). For Okun, the size of 
the leak – or how much efficiency loss one is willing to tolerate to increase equality -, 
is a matter of taste. Okun compared a Rawls who would always prefer equality no 
matter how large the leak, to a Friedman who would give priority to efficiency, and 
would have a very low tolerance for leaks (Okun, 1975: 92).  
Okun’s equality/efficiency trade-off has become a classic, but not everyone agrees there 
is actually a trade-off between equality and efficiency. Osberg (1995) refers to the 
observation that countries with high equality also tend to grow fast, and that hence the 
trade-off probably does not exist. Le Grand elaborated a convincing argument: 
‘efficiency can be defined only in relation to the ability of forms of social and economic 
organization to attain their primary objectives and that therefore efficiency cannot itself 
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be one of those primary objectives. In this sense, if equity is one of the objectives it is 
meaningless to talk of a trade-off (either in value or production) between equity and 
efficiency. Efficiency is […] a secondary objective that only acquires meaning with 
reference to primary objectives such as equity’ (Le Grand, 1990: 560). Trade-offs, he 
argues, ‘can only occur between […] primary objectives, of which efficiency is not one’ 
(199: 566). Le Grand (1990) further argues that when people talk about the equity-
efficiency trade-off, they probably don’t mean efficiency in its technical sense, but 
instead they are thinking on economic growth or Pareto-optimality.  
DID EFFICIENCY BECOME A PRIMARY VALUE IN PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT? 
Technically, Le Grand is right. Yet, Rutgers and van der Meer (2010) argue that 
efficiency has always had a more substantive meaning in public administration (mainly 
up till the 1960s) beyond the mere technical one (as also used in Le Grand’s argument). 
Especially in recent decades, we would argue that efficiency in the public sector has 
also become a primary objective itself. Efficiency improvements have been at the core 
of many public management reforms, and the big NPM reforms such as consumerism, 
agencification, performance management, or competition were all implemented with 
an aim of improving efficiency (Andrews, 2011: 282). Bozeman similarly posits the 
primacy of efficiency within NPM: ‘according to almost all descriptions of NPM, the 
driving values are performance and efficiency, while fairness, by any definition, rarely 
received much emphasis in NPM’ (Bozeman, 2007: 80). In the same book, he argues: 
‘The values embodied in privatization and NPM […] are efficiency and effectiveness 
values, not equity, fairness, or communal values’ (Bozeman, 2007: 82). NPM’s focus 
on efficiency in this way stands in sharp contrast to the New Public Administration in 
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the 1970s, where social equity was the core value (Box, 2015: Frederickson, 2005a; 
Gooden, 2015). While the dominance of NPM appears to have waned in public 
administration scholarship and practice, it remains a core value in newer paradigms as 
well. 
From the administrative point of view, efficiency is broadly considered a core 
administrative value (Rutgers and van der Meer, 2010; Andrews and Entwistle, 2013: 
De Graaf and Paanakker, 2014). The traditional bureaucratic model is characterized by 
both equity and efficiency: equity as the result of law and rule based behavior; and 
efficiency as a result of specialization and standardization. Yet efficiency ‘has come to 
be associated with the private sector solutions embraced by the New Public 
Management’ (Andrews and Entwistle, 2013: 247). Van Wart and Berman (1999) see 
a move towards a tougher standard of efficiency, and a wider value change of what is 
defined as productivity following the introduction of NPM-management tools. 
Especially after the introduction of the new public economics thinking in public 
administration, efficiency has become an objective in its own right, rather than a 
secondary one supporting the achievement of other objectives, such as equity. 
Jørgensen and Rutgers (2014), following an analysis of historic public sector job 
adverts, find that, while the importance attached to NPM values has increased 
substantially over time, “New Public Management values do not crowd out other 
values, rather value intensity increases” (2014: 59). 
The apparent contradiction between equity and efficiency has been one of the main 
bases for criticizing NPM. NPM´s focus on the bottom line may have come at the cost 
of equity and therefore safeguards are needed to protect values that are under attack. 
This has been the case in utilities where public values such as universal service, 
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affordability or continuity has to be legally protected in the wake of privatization or 
liberalization (De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006; Van de Walle, 2008). 
In Hood’s (1991) seminal article on NPM, efficiency (a ‘sigma’ value) and equity (a 
‘theta’ value) represent different families of administrative values. According to Hood, 
NPM is characterized by sigma values, with little regard for equity. The latter can be 
achieved through typical NPM-like programming and target setting (Hood, 1991: 10). 
One could also argue equity-efficiency tension is not inherent to NPM, but that 
efficiency is a precondition for equity to be possible – first increasing the size of the 
cake in order to allow for a more equitable distribution of it.  
 
EXPLAINING THE VALUE TRADE-OFFS CIVIL SERVANTS 
MAKE 
Early studies on public values have limited themselves to categorizing values or 
studying the presence of values within organizations (Jørgensen and Bozeman, 2007). 
Some scholars have looked at value statements of government organizations 
(Kernaghan, 2003) or at codes of conduct (Jørgensen and Sørensen, 2013). Other 
research has looked at value preferences of civil servants, and increasingly, scholars 
have started to look at the value conflicts they experience (De Graaf, Huberts, and 
Smulder, 2016; Oldenhof, Postma, and Putters, 2014).  
Recent debates have focused on value pluralism in public administration (Perry et al., 
2014). This is “the idea that our moral values or conceptions of the good are many and 
varied and that we often find they come into conflict with one another in ways that do 
not permit any easy reconciliation or solution” (Spicer, 2015: 25). A lot of research has 
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looked at how organizations cope with such trade-offs (see, e.g., Thacher and Rein, 
2004; Stewart, 2006; Steenhuisen and van Eeten, 2008).  
Our article contributes to the latter growing body of research by focusing on the equity-
efficiency trade-offs public officials make. Earlier research looked at the value choices 
and preferences of public officials (Guy, 1990), or at the a correlation between civil 
servants’ support for efficient supply and their commitment to the public interest 
(Andersen et al., 2012). Yet, in a study among state and local administrators, Molina 
and McKeown (2012) found that efficiency ranked low in importance among a set of 
values. In a similar vein, Vrangbæk (2009), in a study of value orientations of public 
managers in Denmark, found that while managers listed efficiency as a value, they do 
not put it on their list of the most important values in their work. He also found that 
efficiency was seen as less important by managers working in more operational 
organizations (who, instead, emphasized satisfying user needs), and more important by 
those working in more traditional bureaucratic and administrative organizations. De 
Graaf and Paanakker (2015) reported on interviews with Dutch aldermen and senior 
administrators about conflicts between performance and procedural values. They found 
that respondents mainly considered that conflict exists between lawfulness and 
transparency on the one hand, and between efficiency and effectiveness on the other. 
EXPLAINING VALUE PREFERENCES 
We follow Molina’s definition of value – ‘as a complex cognitive-emotional preference 
for some object, quality, or characteristic that serves as either a means to an end 
(instrumental value) or an end in itself (terminal value)’ (Molina, 2015: 50). Molina´s 
definition emphasizes the importance of taking into account the social and 
administrative context of the administrators when explaining their values and the trade-
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offs they make (see also, Bozeman, 2008). We have earlier referred to the New Public 
Administration’s attention for social equity as a result of poverty and discrimination in 
society, and to NPM’s focus on efficiency as the result of inefficiencies and savings 
and the rise of new public economics. In this article, we assume that the context 
influences the value trade-offs officials make. This context is multifaceted, and consists 
of public officials´ daily work environment, their prior experience and exposure to 
administrative values, the administrative system they are part of, and the society within 
which they operate. Four hypotheses emanate from this assumption. 
 
H1: Distance hypothesis: Closer distance to recipients of policies and services is 
related to a higher pro-equity orientation 
We expect that proximity to the recipients of policies and services makes a public 
official more equity-oriented. The context of working at a larger distance (not 
necessarily physical) from the actual recipients may make officials more concerned 
with internal organizational pressures towards efficiency (such as budgetary pressures), 
rather than with the needs of external recipients. On the contrary, proximity means 
public officials can more easily observe the consequences of their choices on individual 
people, and have a more direct knowledge of their needs. This argument follows those 
that have been made in studies on representative bureaucracy (Oberfield, 2016) and on 
street-level discretion that describes public sector workers as either state agents or 
citizen agents (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2010). 
We assume, first, that heads of unit are physically closer to the recipients of policies 
and services than top managers. Lower-ranked officials are more likely to be 
operational managers of units providing services, and one could argue they are therefore 
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better informed about what is happening on the street-level. Second, we assume that 
public officials working for a smaller organization are closer to the actual recipients, 
because they may have a higher likelihood of coming in touch with actual recipients, 
whereas such direct contact is delegated to lower-level employees in large 
organizations. Also, large organizations are more likely to consist of several regional 
offices, with most of the management residing in the head office. Thus, we expect both 
distance measures (a lower hierarchical position and working in a smaller organization) 
to be positively related to a higher pro-equity orientation. We also expect that officials 
working for public sector agencies will have a higher pro-equity orientation. We follow 
a definition of agencies as an executive body within government with a certain degree 
of autonomy and specialization, and mainly involved in implementation rather than in 
policy making (Verhoest et al., 2010). In this article, agencies are contrasted with 
ministries and departments (labeled as government in the tables). Their structure and 
tasks mean agencies might be closer to the recipients of services and policies, and tend 
to serve them more directly than ministries and departments. This assumption is in line 
with earlier findings by Vrangbæk (2009) who found that Danish managers working in 
operational organizations tended to find satisfying user needs more important than 
efficiency, whilst efficiency was mainly seen as important in more administrative parts 
of government. Jørgensen (2006) found that Danish agency-level respondents attached 
considerable lower importance to efficiency and higher importance to equal 
opportunities and user needs than respondents in departments did. Both findings go 
against the expectations of agencies as carriers of NPM values, such as efficiency. On 
this regard, Van Thiel and Van der Wal (2010) found that Dutch agencies considered 
NPM-related values, such as profitability, more than ministries did. Andersen et al. 
(2012), however, did not find a significant difference between the score on efficient 
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supply as a value for respondents working in authorities (ministries and equivalent 
organizations) and agencies in the Danish public sector, neither a difference between 
service provision versus regulatory/administration oriented-organizations 
 
H2: Private sector exposure hypothesis: the more a public official has been exposed to 
private sector management values, the more pro-efficiency oriented he/she will be 
This hypothesis conceives that the habitus of a public official shapes his or her value 
preferences. Public officials’ values have been impacted by private sector management 
ideas (Maesschalck, 2004). More specifically, we assume that exposure to a private 
sector environment instils officials with stronger preferences for efficiency. 
Frederickson (2005b) described the crucial distinction between the public and private 
sector as a different trade-off between efficiency and fairness: whereas for the former, 
fairness is the main value, efficiency is the leading value for the private sector.  
Public-private differences have attracted a fair deal of attention in the public values 
literature, especially following an influx of managers in the public sector with private 
sector experiences – so called sector switchers (De Graaf and van der Wal, 2008; 
Boardman, Bozeman and Ponomariov, 2010). Still, there is discussion on whether 
differences in values between the public and private sectors are actually that important. 
On this regard, Van der Wal, De Graaf and Lasthuizen (2008) pointed out that there are 
indeed differences in the values public and private managers find important, yet their 
empirical work showed that both groups attach equal importance to efficiency as a value 
driving their work.  
Exposure to the private sector can happen in different ways: prior work experience in 
the private sector, or having enjoyed a business-oriented education. Long tenure in the 
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public sector is, on contrary, an indicator of having been exposed to the public sector 
habitus. We assume that public officials with long tenure in the public sector had their 
formative years before the advent of NPM and its strong focus on results (Tait, 1997). 
 
H3. Country administrative tradition hypothesis: Public officials in Scandinavian 
countries are more pro-equity oriented, those in Transition countries are more pro-
efficiency oriented 
This hypothesis looks into the assumption that it is not just an official’s organization or 
individual background what shapes his or her value preferences, but rather the broader 
administrative tradition within which they work. Administrative tradition refers to what 
is seen to be normal and acceptable in a country or organization (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004: 41). It is “a more or less enduring pattern in the style and substance of public 
administration” (Painter and Peters, 2010: 6). Classifying countries according to their 
dominant administrative tradition is far from simple, because most countries exhibit 
characteristics of different administrative traditions, although many attempts have been 
made (Peters, 2001; Hajnal, 2003).  
To address this hypothesis, we take Hammerschmid, Meyer and Demmke´s (2007) 
classification of European countries according to their administrative traditions. These 
authors classify the European countries according to five different administrative 
traditions: Continental European, Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, South European and 
Transition. The core of this distinction is based on the centrality of the state and the 
importance of administrative vs. common law in a country. In Rechtsstaat-oriented 
systems, the state defines what the public interest is (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014), 
and uses this to regulate society whilst strict equality before the law is an important 
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value. Within this diverse group of countries, Southern-European countries are 
characterized by a very strong legal approach to governance (Hajnal, 2003), and we 
thus expect a strong orientation towards equity. In Scandinavian countries the state is 
an important actor at the core of the social democratic welfare system, reflected in an 
equity orientation that is0 stronger than that in Continental and Southern European 
countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In those countries where the Rechtsstaat tradition 
is less prominent, a public interest approach is reflected in administrative pragmatism 
and thus more tolerance for a pure efficiency orientation. This is especially the case for 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Transition countries, as they are still frequently called, in 
Central and Eastern Europe also exhibit similarities to these countries because of the 
lower importance attached to egalitarianism values (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997). 
 
H4. Popular preferences hypothesis: Public officials in countries where population is 
more left-wing are more pro-equity oriented  
A fourth hypothesis assumes that public officials are responsive to their environment 
and make choices that reflect the make-up of the population they are serving. This is in 
line with Peters´ (2001) hypothesis that public bureaucracies and the people therein ´are 
bound by many thin but strong bonds to their societies, and the values of those societies´ 
(2001: 36), and that “general value orientations in the society will influence the 
behavior of individuals working within formal organizations” (2001: 36). Though far 
from perfect (Bauer et al., 2016), the left/right distinction is traditionally used to 
describe broad political preferences, whereby left is generally associated with a 
redistributive preference, whereas right stands for a more market-oriented outlook (De 
Vries, Hakhverdian and Lancee, 2013). In the context of this article, this means that 
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public officials will be more equity-oriented in countries where the population is more 
politically left wing and thus presumably supportive of redistribution and equity, and 
more efficiency-oriented where the population is more right wing. 
METHODS  
For our analysis, we use data from the COCOPS Top Public Executive Survey 
(Hammerschmid et al., 2016). This survey was part of the European Union Seventh 
Framework research project “Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the 
Future” (COCOPS). It provides a cross-national perspective of European’s public 
officials’ views on public administration and its reforms, as well as on their values and 
motivations as regards their civil service The COCOPS survey, launched between 2012 
and 2014, is an open access, large-scale survey, based on a full census of public officials 
at central government and agencies in all policy fields, encompassing 16 European 
countries at the time of analysis. It was originally organized to study administrative 
reform trends, but also contains items about officials´ values.  
The secondary use of the data means that not all independent variables are available in 
the survey in the desired form. For the purposes of this article, we consider data 
corresponding to 14 countries. Prior to the data analysis we dismissed data for the UK, 
due to the low overall response rate in this country and the very high item non-response 
for the dependent variable, as well as the absence of a number of core independent 
variables due to the use of a different questionnaire among a part of the sample. We 
also decided not to use the Serbian data, due to the different composition of the sample, 
and due to the fact that Serbia is not a member of the European Economic Area, which 
means not only it has a political context rather different than that in the rest of the 
countries under analysis, but also that information required for the analysis, derived 
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from the European Social Survey), is not available. For the 14 countries considered, the 
survey yields a sample of 4,866 observations. The sample size corresponding to each 
country, as well as the country-level response rate is detailed in the appendix.  
Our dependent variable is public officials’ position on an equity-efficiency scale. The 
COCOPS survey inquires public officials to answer the following question: “Public 
services often need to balance different priorities. Where would you place your own 
position?”. Answers are provided in a scale ranging from 1 (“equity”) to 7 
(“efficiency”). The average value of the dependent variable is 3.55, with a standard 
deviation of 1.62. In 614 observations (12.6%), information on the dependent variable 
misses. Thus these cases are excluded from the analysis. The main statistics of the 
dependent variable are described in the appendix. 
As independent variables, we use the information from the COCOPS survey on the 
respondents’ individual characteristics (sex, educational attainment, field of education, 
seniority in the public sector and experience in the private sector), the characteristics of 
their post (hierarchical position, size of the organization, type of organization and policy 
area) and the country where the respondent carries out his/her job.  
The first hypothesis posits that public officials working in a lower hierarchical level, 
those working in smaller organizations and those working in an agency are more 
oriented to equity. We operationalize this hypothesis by testing the effect of three 
variables which reflect characteristics of the post. First, the hierarchical level, 
considering the second (“level 2”) and the third levels (“level 3”) as independent 
variables, in comparison to the top level (“level 1”, used as reference category). Second, 
the size of the organization, considering those with less than 50 employees and those 
with between 50 and 500 employees, in comparison to those with more than 500 
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(reference category). And third, the type of organization, comparing those working in 
an agency to those working for a department or ministry.  
Our second hypothesis proposes that public officials with working experience in the 
private sector and those with a business education are more oriented to efficiency 
because they have been exposed more to values typically associated with the private 
sector. On the contrary, we hypothesized that those with longer tenure in the public 
sector are more oriented to equity as a result of a lower exposure to private sector values, 
especially because their formative years in the public sector were mainly before the 
mainstreaming of private management thinking in the public sector. We operationalize 
this hypothesis by analysing the effect of three variables which reflect private sector 
exposure of the respondents. First, to have at least one year of experience working in 
the private sector, in comparison to those who do not have such experience (reference 
category). Second, having a degree in business or economics, considering those with a 
degree in law and in other social sciences or humanities as controls, and the rest as 
reference category (in all cases, the field is referred to that of the highest level of 
education achieved). And third, focusing on seniority in the public sector, we introduce 
independent variables measuring length of tenure in the public sector corresponding to 
the intervals of less than 5 years, from 5 to 10 years and from 10 to 20 years, in 
comparison to those with more than 20 years (reference category).  
The third hypothesis, used Hammerschmid, Meyer and Demmke´s (2007) classification 
of European public administrative traditions to hypothesize that public officials in 
Scandinavian countries are more oriented to equity than those in countries with a 
Continental tradition, whilst those in transition countries are more oriented to 
efficiency. The categorization of our 14 countries according to its public administrative 
tradition is specified in the appendix. We test the effect on the dependent variable of a 
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Scandinavian, a South European administrative tradition and a Transition country, as 
independent variables, in comparison to the Continental European administrative 
tradition (considered as reference category). We aggregate Ireland to the reference 
category, as it is the only country representing the Anglo-Saxon tradition in our sample, 
and it is a very particular case (rather different to the UK), whilst the Continental 
tradition already encompasses a heterogeneous set of countries. 
The fourth hypothesis asserts that public officials in a country with a population more 
politically left-wing are more oriented to equity, and those with a population more 
politically right-wing are more oriented to efficiency. We operationalize this hypothesis 
by considering the average political placement of the population in each country in 
2012, obtained from the European Social Survey (European Social Survey Round 6 
Data, 2012). Average values by country, ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right), are detailed 
in the appendix. Also, we include the standard deviation of the political placement at 
the country level as a control variable, in order to control for the political polarization 
in each country. 
We control for the effect on the dependent variable of other factors included in the 
survey. As regards the individual characteristics, we include the sex of the respondent 
(females in comparison to males) and the highest degree of education achieved (those 
holding a master degree, and those holding a PhD, versus the rest). We dismiss the age 
of the respondent, as it is strongly correlated to his/her seniority in the public sector.  
Studies on administrative tradition assume the existence of a dominant administrative 
tradition within a country that sets its administration and civil servants apart from those 
in other countries. Our approach does not negate this possibility, but also recognizes 
that different parts of the system are (made) responsible for the realization of different 
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value sets (see Thacher and Rein, 2004), which may result in different value trade-offs 
in redistributive vs. distributive parts of the public sector. For this reason, we include 
both policy sector controls (the area in which the public official works), and country 
controls.  
The composition of the sample according to the independent and control variables is 
described in the appendix. The respondents not reporting their sex, seniority in the 
public sector, hierarchical position and size of the organization (326 cases, 6.7% of 
total) are excluded from the econometric analysis. As regards the educational level and 
the experience in the private sector, we combine those cases with item non response 
with the reference category.  
The average value of the equity-efficiency position of public officials for each category 
of independent and control variables used is described in the appendix. Also, figure 1 
shows country averages in public officials’ position as regards this trade-off. As 
observed, Scandinavian countries appear to be notably oriented towards equity. Most 
of the Continental countries are also oriented towards equity, but the Netherlands is 
slightly more oriented towards efficiency. Southern European countries are all close to 
the middle point (4). Finally, the Transition countries show a high heterogeneity: from 
Lithuania, highly oriented towards equity, to Hungary and Estonia, oriented towards 
efficiency. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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We estimate using OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level, in order to correct for correlation of the error term within countries (clusters). We 
test two different models: model 1 is used to test the distance and the private sector 
exposure hypotheses while controlling for country differences; model 2 is used to test 
all four hypotheses (including those focused on the country level) at the same time. 
These models result from the following equations: 
(1) ),,( iiii CountryPostCharIndCharfy =  
(2) ),,,,( iiiiii DevPolAvPolAdmTradPostCharIndCharfy =  
Where: 
yi = position on the equity-efficiency scale by individual i. 
IndChari = vector of individual characteristics by i. 
PostChari = vector of characteristics of the post of i. 
Countryi = country of individual i. 
AdmTradi = administrative tradition of the country of i. 
AvPoli = average political placement in the country of i. 
DevPoli = standard deviation of the political placement in the country of i. 
Model 1 includes independent variables and controls corresponding to individual 
characteristics, characteristics of the post and country binary variables. Model 2 
includes also countries’ administrative tradition and political placement (average and 
standard deviation), instead of the country binary variables. In model 2, robustness 
checks are carried out after the estimations, in order to test for country 
representativeness. This permits to find out if the results are robust to the exclusion of 
data from a single country, and thus to reject that any of the effects obtained result from 
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particular circumstances or data anomalies in a single country. To do so, we repeat the 
estimation 14 times, excluding one country in each of them.  
 
RESULTS 
Public officials working at the third hierarchical level of an organization, and also those 
at the second level, are more oriented towards equity than those at the top level. Results 
are statistically significant both in model 1 and model 2. There are no significant 
differences in the equity-efficiency position of public officials working in an 
organization with less than 50 employees, compared to those working in one of more 
than 500 employees. However, those working in organizations with between 50 and 
500 employees are more oriented towards equity than those in larger ones, both in 
model 1 and model 2. In model 2 we find that those working in an agency are more 
oriented towards equity than those working for the departments or ministries. However, 
in model 1 this result is not significant. This indicates that this result disappears when 
controlling for country heterogeneity. 
For the private-sector exposure hypothesis, we find no significant differences in the 
equity-efficiency position between public officials with at least one year of experience 
in the private sector and the rest, neither in model 1 nor in model 2. We find that those 
whose last educational degree is in business or economics are more oriented towards 
efficiency than the reference category. These results are obtained in both model 1 and 
model 2. In model 1 we obtain that those with less than 5 years of seniority in the public 
sector are more oriented towards efficiency than those with more than 20 years. 
However, this result is non-significant in model 2. That is, the result only appears if 
Equity or efficiency? Explaining public officials’ values 
23 
 
controlling for country heterogeneity. Further details about this finding are provided 
later when explaining the results of robustness checks. 
Public officials working in a country with a Scandinavian administrative tradition are 
more oriented towards equity than those in a country with a Continental European 
tradition. Those in a country with a South European administrative tradition are more 
oriented towards efficiency than the same reference category. For the Transition 
countries, the results are non-significant.  
The test of the popular preferences hypothesis finds that public officials in a country 
where population is more politically right-wing are more oriented to efficiency, whilst 
those with a population more left-wing are more oriented to equity. Political 
polarization, measured by the standard deviation of this variable, has no significant 
effects. 
Among the control variables, looking at the policy area, those working in employment 
services are more oriented to efficiency, whilst those working in health and social 
protection and in education and recreation are more oriented to equity. Finally, there 
are large effects on the dependent variable associated with country differences.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
Robustness checks show the vast majority of the results do not change when any single 
country is dismissed, which proves that they are robust to country representativeness. 
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Nevertheless two results are non-robust. One is working in an agency, which was found 
associated with a more pro-equity orientation in model 2, whilst this effect became non-
significant when controlling for country heterogeneity (model 1). The robustness 
checks show this effect is also non-significant when dismissing data from Austria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania or Spain. This indicates that the relation between working 
in an agency and a more pro-equity orientation only exists in some European countries, 
but not in others. Thus, it is not accepted as a general effect. 
The other effect found as non-robust is that associated with seniority in the public 
sector. In the estimations, seniority in the public sector below 5 years was, in 
comparison with seniority over 20 years, associated to a more pro-efficiency orientation 
in model 1 , but not in model 2. The robustness checks show that a significant effect 
only appears when dismissing data from Spain, Sweden or Portugal, but not in the rest 




This article tested four distinct hypotheses to explain top public officials´ position on 
an equity-efficiency trade-off. We found that a lower hierarchical level is related to a 
higher pro-equity orientation of a public official. This could be considered a partial 
validation of the first hypothesis, which associates a higher pro-equity orientation with 
a closer distance to recipients of policies and services. Nevertheless, alternative 
explanations are also possible. Managers at the top of a public organization appear to 
see their role as being the ultimate responsible person in charge of the proper use of 
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resources, including budgetary accountability towards the political level. Other policy-
relevant concerns – such as equity- may then being taken care of more intensively by 
the managers of specific divisions or departments within the organization. We also 
found that the effect of the type of organization (agency versus a department or 
ministry) is non-significant when controlling for country heterogeneity, and non-robust 
to country representativeness. That is, this effect depends on the country. This result is 
probably due to the large variety in agencies and agencification trends across countries 
(Verhoest et al., 2012). We had hypothesized that respondents in agencies would be 
more equity-oriented because of agencies´ proximity to recipients, yet we also know 
that the specific founding conditions of many agencies as part of wider NPM-style 
reform may have made them more managerial and thus possibly more efficiency-
oriented. Thus, NPM may have resulted in a higher pursuance of efficiency-related 
objectives as a result of the agencification of public administration, at least in certain 
European countries. Finally, the effects obtained as regards the size of an organization 
are not those expected: public officials in medium-size organizations (50 to 500 
employees), but not those in the smallest organizations, are more oriented towards 
equity than those in the largest organizations.  
A second hypothesis looked at whether having been exposed to private sector values 
influences a public official´s position on the equity-efficiency trade-off. This is clearly 
the case for an official´s field of education: those who had a business or economics 
education tend to value efficiency higher. We of course do not know whether this is a 
result of having been exposed more to ways of thinking related to efficiency, whether 
it reflects an absence of concerns for equity in a typical business or economics 
education, or whether it reflects self-selection of individuals more prone to value 
efficiency higher into such fields of education. On the contrary, having worked for the 
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private sector does not have a significant effect. An explanation could be found in the 
specific profiles of managers who have decided to switch from the private to the public 
sector, which may differ depending on the country. The relation between working 
experience in the private sector and public official values needs to be explored further. 
In sum, NPM´s focus on bringing in private management skills does have an impact on 
value trade-offs through the prior education managers received, but the same is not 
demonstrated for the influx of managers with private experience. Finally, the less senior 
public officials are found more oriented to efficiency than their most senior counterparts 
only when correcting for country heterogeneity. Robustness checks showed there are 
remarkable differences between countries on this effect. For this reason, the expected 
relation between a longer track record in the public sector and equity orientation (which 
can be associated with a higher exposure to the traditional public sector habitus) cannot 
be confirmed.  
Besides that, country administrative tradition shows significant effects in public 
officials’ position on a balance between equity and efficiency. Officials in Scandinavian 
countries have a stronger equity-orientation, which confirms the general view of these 
countries as being more concerned with equity. Public officials in Southern European 
countries have a stronger efficiency orientation. Interpreting this effect is not 
necessarily straightforward. Taking a position on the equity-efficiency trade-off can 
indicate also an experienced absence of that value in the organization. This may be the 
case of Southern European countries, as they are characterized by a particularly poor 
self-perception of public sector efficiency, as reflected in the results of the expert survey 
developed by Dahlström et al. (2015). We do not find significant effects for transition 
countries, which could be due to the high heterogeneity of this group.  
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Finally, we found that the values held by senior public officials reflect those held by 
the population in general. This again confirms the importance of looking at context 
when studying administrative values (Molina, 2015). Overall, country effects, and 
effects of characteristics at the country level are very large in the models. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article analyszed the factors that condition European public officials’ position in 
an equity-efficiency trade-off, using a unique survey which provides information on 
public official’s views and motivations across 14 European countries. The results 
obtained contribute to the body of research on conflicting public values in the public 
sector and, particularly, to understand a trade-off which has very remarkable policy 
implications, as that between equity and efficiency. 
The results show how public officials’ daily work context deeply influences their views: 
their individual characteristics, the characteristics of their post and, especially, their 
field and the country where they work condition their position in the equity-efficiency 
trade-off. The hierarchical position, the field of education, the administrative tradition 
in the country and the average political position of the population show significant 
effects on public official’s positions on equity and efficiency. The evidence obtained 
also suggests that NPM reforms may have favoured a more efficiency-oriented public 
administration through a more market-oriented education of public officials and, in 
certain countries, by the increasing role of agencies. 
This article opens the door to further research on public officials’ views on equity and 
efficiency. In particular, there are various points which require further specific analysis. 
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First, the value trade-off is offered in a context-free, abstract way, and the measurement 
is based on a single item. This means answers do not reflect concrete situations, and 
cannot ensure that all respondents interpret the concepts in an equivalent way. 
Multidimensional measures may change the findings. Second, this article has only 
looked at the value trade-off, and not at how public officials cope with such trade-off 
and value conflicts, as is more common in public value research (Van der Wal, de Graaf 
and Lawton, 2011). This would require looking at their actual behaviors. Third, 
coverage of transition countries is limited and includes three highly diverse countries. 
This makes an analysis of the effect of administrative tradition difficult for this group, 
and probably explains the absence of a significant effect for it. Fourth, the agency effect 
reflects the wide variety in agencification trends across European countries, although it 
is hard to interpret because the dataset contains no information about task-specificity of 
the agencies involved beyond an indication of the policy sector within which they 
operate. Fifth, the results obtained for seniority in the public sector and working 
experience in the private sector should be also object of further research, focused on 
which mechanisms (and in which contexts) may contribute to explain the relations 
observed. Finally, and in connection with the two previous points, future research 
should look at the extent of NPM reforms in an organization to see how and whether 
this is related to the value trade-offs made in it. 
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Table 1. Estimates on the factors explaining public official’s equity/efficiency views 
    Model 1 Model 2 
DISTANCE HYPOTHESIS   
Position   
Level 1   
Level 2 -0.190 (0.081)** -0.206 (0.075)** 
Level 3 -0.273 (0.079)*** -0.300 (0.065)*** 
Size of the organization   
< 50 employees 0.021 (0.100) -0.064 (0.106) 
50-500 employees -0.121 (0.045)** -0.168 (0.044)*** 
> 500 employees   
Type of organization   
Government   
Agency -0.097 (0.075) -0.157 (0.075)* 
PRIVATE SECTOR EXP. HYPOT. 
Experience in the private sector 
1 year or more 0.055 (0.060) 0.074 (0.066) 
Field of education 
Law -0.086 (0.072) -0.037 (0.074) 
Business / Economics 0.148 (0.061)** 0.141 (0.057)** 
Other social sciences / humanities -0.045 (0.052) -0.034 (0.050) 
Seniority in the public sector 
< 5 years 0.193 (0.089)** 0.122 (0.102) 
5-10 years 0.135 (0.109) 0.151 (0.108) 
10-20 years 0.100 (0.064) 0.098 (0.063) 
> 20 years   
COUNTRY ADM. TRADITION HYPOT. 
Scandinavian  -1.007 (0.111)*** 
Continental European   
South European  0.623 (0.163)*** 
Transition  -0.187 (0.172) 
POPULAR PREFERENCES HYPOT: 
Average political placement  1.495 (0.210)*** 




Male   
 
Female -0.023 (0.082) -0.054 (0.079) 
Education 




MA -0.017 (0.048) -0.030 (0.042) 
 
PhD 0.090 (0.059) 0.145 (0.043)*** 
Policy area   
General gov. & foreign aff. 0.068 (0.057) 0.076 (0.057) 
Finance & economic affairs 0.011 (0.075) -0.006 (0.081) 
Infrastr., transport & environment -0.019 (0.053) 0.021 (0.057) 
Defence, justice & pub. order 0.022 (0.076) 0.010 (0.075) 
Employment 0.234 (0.091)** 0.286 (0.095)** 
Health & social protection -0.187 (0.042)*** -0.208 (0.044)*** 
Education & recreation -0.200 (0.065)*** -0.201 (0.061)*** 
Country   
 
Austria -0.373 (0.031)***  
 
Denmark -0.144 (0.067)*  
 
Estonia 0.639 (0.059)***  
 
France   
 
Germany -0.358 (0.056)***  
 
Hungary 0.787 (0.041)***  
 
Ireland 0.285 (0.040)***  
 
Italy 0.315 (0.022)***  
 
Lithuania -0.542 (0.063)***  
 
Netherlands 0.566 (0.037)***  
 
Norway -0.057 (0.046)  
 
Portugal 0.259 (0.083)***  
 
Spain 0.236 (0.025)***  
 
Sweden -0.507 (0.073)***  
Constant 3.795 (0.087)*** -3.584 (0.971)*** 
N 3,926 3,926 
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Response rate Country model 
(Hammerschmid et al., 2007) 
Political placement (0 –left - 




Austria 493 35.04% Continental European 4.74 1.85 
Denmark 147 19.39% Scandinavian 5.33 2.37 
Estonia 318 34.83% Transition 5.46 2.06 
France 587 17.25% Continental European 4.95 2.54 
Germany 446 22.76% Continental European 4.61 1.90 
Hungary 250 27.06% Transition 5.40 2.11 
Ireland 375 38.27% Anglo-Saxon 5.13 1.77 
Italy 172 17.72% South European 4.76 2.68 
Lithuania 432 39.34% Transition 4.93 2.22 
Netherlands 196 29.25% Continental European 5.41 2.12 
Norway 334 27.90% Scandinavian 5.64 2.11 
Portugal 296 28.52% South European 4.90 2.10 
Spain 297 17.64% South European 4.51 2.39 
Sweden 523 40.45% Scandinavian 5.33 2.22 
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Composition of the sample, by individual and post-related characteristics 
 N % 
Sex 4,148  
 Male 2,634 63.5% 
 Female 1,514 36.5% 
Education  4,238  
 MA 2,547 60.1% 
 PhD 738 17.4% 
Field of education 4,238   
 Law 1,099 25.9% 
 Business / Economics 1,075 25.4% 
 Other social sciences / humanities 1,255 29.6% 
Seniority in the public sector  4,177  
 < 5 years 302 7.2% 
 5-10 years 399 9.6% 
 10-20 years 1,262 30.2% 
 > 20 years 2,214 53.0% 
Experience in the private sector 4,238   
 1 year or more 1,964 46.3% 
Position 4,112   
 Level 1 921 22.4% 
 Level 2 1,765 42.9% 
 Level 3 1,426 34.7% 
Size of the organization  4,195  
 < 50 employees 394 9.4% 
 50-500 employees 1,918 45.7% 
 > 500 employees 1,883 44.9% 
Type of organization 4,238   
 Government 2,139 50.5% 
 Agency 2,099 49.5% 
Policy area 4,238   
 General gov. & foreign affairs 840 19.8% 
 Finance & economic affairs 788 18.6% 
 Infrastr., transport & environment 675 15.9% 
 Defence, justice & pub. order 630 14.9% 
 Employment 477 11.3% 
 Health & social protection 781 18.4% 
 Education & recreation 576 13.6% 
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Average value of the dependent variable, by individual characteristics, post-related 
characteristics and country 
 Average s.d. 
Equity-efficiency position (min =1, max =7) 3.55 1.62 
Sex   
 Male 3.59 1.61 
 Female 3.48 1.62 
Education    
 MA 3.56 1.62 
 PhD 3.41 1.59 
Field of education    
 Law 3.51 1.62 
 Business / Economics 3.76 1.60 
 Other social sciences / humanities 3.49 1.61 
Seniority in the public sector    
 < 5 years 3.88 1.68 
 5-10 years 3.69 1.68 
 10-20 years 3.62 1.60 
 > 20 years 3.45 1.59 
Experience in the private sector    
 1 year or more 3.57 1.61 
Position    
 Level 1 3.68 1.60 
 Level 2 3.58 1.60 
 Level 3 3.47 1.64 
Size of the organization   
 < 50 employees 3.49 1.70 
 50-500 employees 3.50 1.59 
 > 500 employees 3.63 1.63 
Type of organization    
 Government 3.64 1.66 
 Agency 3.47 1.56 
Policy area    
 General gov. & foreign affairs 3.67 1.61 
 Finance & economic affairs 3.72 1.64 
 Infrastr., transport & environment 3.55 1.57 
 Defence, justice & pub. order 3.61 1.68 
 Employment 3.67 1.49 
 Health & social protection 3.38 1.57 
 Education & recreation 3.29 1.59 
 
 
